Insiders refer to it as a routine review of duties, which are sure to be extended; however, the industry’s attention is currently focused on the outcomes of the ongoing safeguard investigation.

Following Euroalliages’ March request, the European Commission (EC) initiated a review of anti-dumping duties on ferrosilicon imports from Russia and China. The products covered by the review fall under HS codes 72022100, 72022910, and 72022990.

Anti-dumping duties on imports from China, Russia, and several other countries were first introduced in the EU in 2008. Over the years that followed, individual countries were exempted from these duties. The last time the duties against Russia and China were reviewed, they were extended for a further five years, entering into force in 2020.

Therefore, the current review is linked to the imminent expiry of the current measures. For reference, the current duty rates, depending on the producer, concerning China are as follows: Erdos Xijin Kuangye, 15.6%; Lanzhou Good Land Ferroalloy Factory, 29.0%; all others, 31.2%.

Regarding Russia, the duties are as follows: Bratsk Ferroalloy Plant, 17.8%; all others, 22.7%.

The extension of the duties is not disputed by market participants or Project Blue analysts, despite customs statistics indicating that officially reported imports of Russian ferrosilicon to the EU fell by 94% from 2022 to 2024, while imports from China declined by 81% over the same period.

Furthermore, Russian ferrosilicon was included in the EU’s 12th package of sanctions regulations, prohibiting its delivery after 20 December 2024 for contracts signed before 20 December 2023.
Nevertheless, Russian alloys continue to enter the EU market (almost always illegally) at increasing volumes.

The most common practice for importing Russian ferrosilicon is to falsify certificates of origin and import it under the guise of being from Iran, Kazakhstan, and other countries. In particular, ferrosilicon imports from Kazakhstan increased by 28% in 2024 compared to 2022, while purchases from Iran increased by 17% over the same period. There were also anomalous jumps in imports from non-traditional countries, such as Türkiye and Georgia.

Given the global overcapacity of ferrosilicon, as well as the recently imposed restrictions on US imports, the EU market remains vulnerable to potential growth in imports and competition. A more significant threat to the global ferrosilicon market would be the potential removal of export duties in China. However, so far, there are no signals in favour of this decision.

Meanwhile, the market’s attention is focused on the EC’s investigation into the import of alloys from all countries (according to some sources, including even Iceland and Norway), launched in December last year. Preliminary results are expected in September.

Nevertheless, if any barrier measures are also taken against Iceland and Norway, the EU market risks facing a shortage of ferrosilicon, which could potentially provide upward price support for domestic producers. Notably, the two countries account for up to 26% of the EU’s alloy imports and approximately 47% of its consumption.